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CHAPTER 4 
Labor and Employment Law 
NELSON G. ROSS* 
MARK V. NUCCIO** 
§ 4.1. Introduction. During the Survey year, there were a number of 
very significant decisions issued by the Supreme Judicial Court in the area 
of labor and employment law. These cases addressed issues involving 
mixed-motive discharges in the public sector, the legal status of labor 
unions, preemption under federal labor law of state libel and tortious 
interference with employment claims, the constitutionality of agency shop 
rebate procedures, the validity of multi-year contractual commitments, 
and the open meeting law. 1 
§ 4.2. Public Sector Mixed-Motive Discbarges. During 1981, in Trustees 
of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Commission, 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the Labor Relations Commission (the "Commission") 
could find a discharge from employment unlawful under chapter 150A of 
the General Laws, the state private sector labor statute, only if it found 
"that the employee would not have been discharged but for his protected 
activity .... If, however, a lawful cause would have led the employer to 
the same conclusion even in the absence of protected conduct, the dis-
charge must not be disturbed."2 In addition to adopting this "but for" 
test, the Court set forth the allocation of the burden of proof in unlawful 
discharge cases under chapter 150A,3 selecting the all(jcation of the bur-
* NELSON G. ROSS is a partner in the Boston law firm of Ropes and Gray. 
** MARK V. NUCCIO is an associate in the Boston law firm of Ropes and Gray. 
§ 4.1. 1 The Massachusetts Appeals Court decided several factually interesting cases in 
the area oflabor and employment law, but these decisions did not break significant new legal 
ground. See, e.g., Trinique v. Mount Wachusett Community College Faculty Association, 
14 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 437 N.E.2d 564 (1982) (involving the duty of fair representation); 
Local 1111, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. Labor Relations Com-
mission, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 236,437 N.E.2d 1079 (1982) (involving whether a determination 
by the Labor Relations Commission on a bargaining unit and certified representative is a 
final order for purposes of appeal); Babcock v. Labor Relations Commission, 14 Mass. App. 
Ct. 650, 441 N.E.2d 786 (1982) (involving a mixed-motive discharge). 
§ 4.2. 1 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2183, 428 N .E.2d 124. See Ross, Labor and Employment 
Law, 1981 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 7.2, at 168-73. 
2 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2183, 2185-86, 428 N.E.2d 124, 126. 
3 ld. at 2186, 428 N.E.2d at 127. 
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den of proof used in sex discrimination cases. 4 Under that allocation, the 
employee must bear the ultimate burden of persuasion, but may rely on a 
prima facie showing to shift to the employer a limited burden of producing 
evidence. S If the employer states a lawful reason for its decision and 
produces supporting facts, the prima facie case is rebutted.6 The burden 
of persuasion then is on the employee, who must prove by a preponder-
ance of evidence that the alleged lawful reason was not the actual reason 
for the dismissal. 7 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court in Southern Wor-
cester County Regional Vocational School District v. Labor Relations 
Commissions considered the appropriate legal standard and burden of 
proof which should govern unlawful discharge cases arising in the public 
sector under chapter 150E of the General Laws.9 The Court also consid-
ered the remedial powers of the Commission under chapter 150E.IO The 
Court applied the Forbes Library test, holding that the Commission could 
determine that a discharge violates chapter 150E if it is proven that the 
employee would not have been discharged but for his protected activity. I I 
Additionally, as in Forbes Library, the Court ruled that the employee 
must bear the ultimate burden of persuading the Commission that the 
discharge is unlawful. 12 As to the remedial powers of the Commission, the 
Court held that the Commission has the power to direct a school commit-
tee to reinstate a teacher even if reinstatement means that the teacher 
attains tenure. 13 
The Southern Worcester case arose when eight non-tenured teachers 
filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that their termination 
violated section 10(a)(1)-(4) of chapter 150E.14 The Commission issued a 
complaint and after hearings IS ruled that the Southern Worcester County 
Regional Vocational School District (the "School District") had commit-
ted unfair labor practices and ordered the teachers reinstated with back 
pay, and without prejudice to the teachers' seniority and tenure rights. 16 
4 /d. at 2190, 428 N.E.2d at 127-28. 
5 Id. at 2190, 428 N.E.2d at 128. 
6 Id. 
7Id. 
s 386 Mass. 414,436 N.E.2d 380 (1982). 
9 Id. at 414, 436 N.E.2d at 381. G.L. c. 150E, §§ 1-15 is the statute governing public sector 
labor relations in Massachusetts. 
10 386 Mass. at 414-15, 436 N.E.2d at 380-81. 
11 Id. at 415, 436 N.E.2d at 381. 
12 Id. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. at 416-17, 436 N.E.2d at 382-83. 
15 Id. at 417, 436 N.E.2d at 383. 
16/d. 
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The School District appealed and a judge of the superior court affirmed 
the Commission's decision and ordered the School District to comply 
with the Commission's rulingY The School District appealed to the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court which reversed and remanded the case to 
the Commission. 18 The Commission then applied for further appellate 
review and the Supreme Judicial Court granted the application in order to 
set out the legal standard and burden of proof governing unlawful dis-
charge cases arising in the public sector under section 10(a)(1) and (3) of 
chapter 150E.19 
The Court began by considering the legal standard to be applied in 
discharge cases arising under section lO(a)(1) and (3) of chapter 150E.20 
The School District argued that the Commission had applied an incorrect 
legal standard and burden of proof. 21 The Commission had employed the 
dominant motive, or "but for" test. 22 In allocating the burden of proof, 
the Commission had followed the standard used in Massachusetts sex 
discrimination cases. 23 The Court observed that the standard which the 
Commission had employed was that which the Court had adopted for 
private sector unlawful discharge cases in Forbes Library,24 The Court 
stated that both the legal standard and burden of proof used in Forbes 
Library, which were applied by the Commission in Southern Worcester, 
also apply to unlawful discharge claims arising under Chapter 150E. 25 
According to the Court, this approach strikes an "equitable balance 
between the rights of an employer whose duty . . . is to promote the 
efficiency of public services through its public employees, and the rights 
of a non-tenured public school teacher to be secure in his employment, 
free from discrimination due to his union activity. "26 
The Court next turned to the School District's argument that the Com-
mission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and, there-
fore, should be reversed.27 Noting that it was not free to make a de novo 
review, the Court found that the Commission's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence. 28 According to the Court, the teachers in question 
17 /d. 
18/d. 
19/d. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. at 417-18, 436 N.E.2d at 383. 
22 Jd. at 418, 436 N.E.2d at 383. 
23 Jd. 
24 Jd. 
2S Jd. at 419, 436 N .E.2d at 384. 
26 /d. (citing Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 
So.2d 108, 117 (Fla. App. 1977)). 
27 Jd. 
28 Jd. at 420, 436 N.E.2d at 384. The Court referred to the statutory definition of 
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were active members of their union, the Bay Path Association, a fact 
known to their employer, and they had good work recotds. 29 The Court 
found, based on such factors, that the teachers had established a prima 
facie case of unlawful anti-union discrimination. 30 While the School Dis-
trict offered evidence in rebuttal, the Court pointed out that it was for the 
Commission alone to determine credibility.31 
Finally, the Court turned its attention to the question whether the 
Commission had the authority to direct a school committee to reinstate a 
teacher even where, as here, reinstatement meant that the teacher would 
be granted tenure. 32 The School District argued that the school committee 
alone had authority to grant tenure under sections 41 and 42 of chapter 71 
of the General Laws. 33 The Court found, however, that the statutory 
provisions which grant public employees the right to form, join and assist 
unions and to engage in lawful, concerted activities limits the school 
committee's right to refuse to renew the employment of a non-tenured 
teacher.34 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Commission has 
authority to order reinstatement of a teacher who has been discriminated 
against for engaging in union activity. 35 The Court observed that this 
includes an order to rehire a non-tenured teacher. 36 The School District 
argued, however, that under School Committee of Danvers v. Tyman,37 a 
school committee could not be forced to "delegate ... its authority to 
make decisions concerning tenure."38 The Court pointed out, however, 
that the school committee here had not attempted to delegate its authority 
over tenure to the Commission. 39 Instead, the Court stated, the ~egisla­
ture had limited the power ofthe school committee to deny tenure.40 In a 
footnote, the Court observed that it had recently limited the "nondele-
gability doctrine" in Blue Hills Regional District School Committee v. 
Flight ,41 where the Court had ordered the enforcement of an arbitrator's 
"substantial evidence" which is, under G.L. c. 30A, § 1(6), "such evidence as Ii reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." ld. at 419-20,436 N .E.2d at 384. 
29/d. at 420, 436 N.E.2d at 384. ' 
30 ld. 
31 /d. at 420-21, 436 N.E.2d at 384-85. 
32 ld. at 421, 436 N.E.2d at 385. 
33 /d. 
3~ ld. at 422, 436 N.E.2d at 385. 
35 Jd. at 422, 436 N.E.2d at 386. 
36 /d. 
37 372 Mass. 106, 112-14, 360 N.E.2d 877, 880-82 (1977). 
38 386 Mass. at 423, 436 N .E.2d at 386 (citing School Committee of Danvers v. Tyman, 
372 Mass. 106, 111,360 N.E.2d 877, 880 (1977». 
39 /d. 
40 ld. 
41 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1240, 421 N.E.2d 755. 
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decision to promote a teacher who had suffered sex discrimination,42 a 
decision which also ordinarily is a nondelegable managerial prerogative. 
In the Court's view, denying a teacher tenure because of union activity 
was equally unlawful.43 Therefore, the Court concluded, the nondele-
gability doctrine does not apply to this case.44 
The Southern Worcester decision is interesting in two respects. Re-
cently, the United States Supreme Court, in National Labor Relations 
Board v. Transportation Management Corp.,45 held that, although the 
Geijeral Counsel of the Board has the burden of persuading the Board that 
anti-union animus contributed to a decision to discharge an employee, 
once that burden has been met, the burden shifts to the employer to prove 
that the employee would have been discharged for a lawful reason not-
withstanding the employee's protected activities.46 This allocation of the 
burden of proof differs significantly from the allocation enunciated by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Forbes Library47 and now in Southern Worces-
ter.48 The Supreme Judicial Court has chosen an allocation of the burden 
of proof similar to that which was rejected by the Supreme Court. The 
allocation approved by the Supreme Judicial Court leaves th~ employer 
with fln easier task than under the National Labor Relatioijs Act. Since 
tl1e Massachusetts standard is based on the Court's own independent 
reasoning, and not on the First Circuit's standard, it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Judicial Court will alter its standard in hght of Transportation 
Management. 
The Court's application of the Forbes Library principles to the public 
sector was predictable.49 The Court's resolution of the remedy issue in 
Southern Worcester was less so. It is obvious that the Court had to 
contend with two countervailing policies in reaching its conclusion that 
the Commission may require reinstatement even if it results in a teacher 
obtaining tenure. On the one hand, the policy of protecting public em-
ployees from unlawful conduct by their employers should dictate 
reinstatement with tenure, if tenure would have been obtained had the 
employee not been wrongfully dismissed. On the other hand, the policy of 
allowing school committees the prerogative to grant or deny tenure for 
valid reasons suggests tpat the Commission should not have the authority 
42 386 Mass. at 423 n.lO, 436 N.E.2d at 386 n.1O (citing Blue Hills Regional Dist. School 
Comm. v. Flight, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1240, 1242, 421 N.E.2d 755, 756). 
4) Id. at 423-~4, 436 N.E.2d at 386. 
44 Id. at 424, 436 N.E.2d at 386. 
45 51 U.S.L.W. 4761 (U.S. June 15, 1983). 
46 ld. at 4764. 
47 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra notes 12, 25-26 and accompanying text. 
49 See Ross, Labor and Employment Law, 1981 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 7.2, at 172. 
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to issue an order resulting in tenure. Wrestling with these policies, the 
Court concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the former policy 
outweighed the latter. Thus, the Court held that the Commission could 
order reinstatement, although such was equal to granting tenure. In so 
holding, perhaps the Court was influenced by the fact that a grant of 
tenure is not a guarantee of continued employment if then~ are legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for termination. 
Since the reinstatement ordered by the Commission in its original 
decision was not challenged by the School District, the Court may not 
have considered whether there exists any middle ground available to 
accommodate both policies. A middle ground of sorts was found by the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court in a different context in Puglisi v. School 
Committee of Whitman. 50 There, the Appeals Court addressed the rem-
edy for a decision of a school committee to discharge a principal made in 
violation of the open meeting law,51 Instead of indirectly granting tenure 
to the principal by crediting the time elapsed during the pendency of the 
litigation, the Appeals Court determined that the plaintiff was only enti-
tled to back pay from the date of the wrongful discharge. 52 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Appeals Court noted that there was no evidence of bad 
faith by the school committee in appealing a lower court's ruling.53 The 
court stated that "[t]he fault inherent in ordering reinstatement ... is that 
reinstatement may be read as conferring entitlement to the position. "54 
The Appeals Court ordered that the principal receive an award of back 
pay from the date of the wrongful discharge to the date when the school 
committee acted in conformity with the open meeting law on the issue 
whether the principal should be dismissed or otherwise disciplined. 55 
The distinction between Puglisi and Southern Worcester, of course, is 
that in Southern Worcester the school committee had exhibited bad faith 
in the decision not to reappoint the teachers, and had not merely violated 
a procedural requirement as in Puglisi. Nevertheless, the practicalities of 
a remedy which allows the school committee to give final consideration to 
the tenure decision, directing it to do so without regard to the union 
activities of the teachers, are evident. The Puglisi court admonished, 
"[r]einstatement ... may by indirection punish teaching personnel and 
students as well as the school committee by burdening the system with an 
incompetent. "56 In Southern Worcester, the Supreme Judicial Court 
50 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 46, 414 N.E.2d 613. 
51 ld. at 47, 414 N.E.2d at 613. 
52 ld. at 51 & n.6, 414 N.E.2d at 615 & n.6, 616. 
53 /d. at 51, 414 N.E.2d at 615. 
54 ld. at 50, 414 N.E.2d at 615. 
55 /d. at 51, 414 N.E.2d at 615-16. 
56 /d. at 50 n.5, 414 N.E.2d at 615 n.5. 
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made it clear that this Appeals Court admonition will not apply when it is 
determined that the teacher would have attained tenure but for the School 
District's unlawful discrimination. 
§ 4.3. Labor Union as a Party Plaintiff or Defendant. At common law 
labor unions, as unincorporated associations, could neither sue nor be 
sued as legal entities. I They were considered merely aggregations of 
individuals pursuing a common purpose. 2 As a result, in order to sue a 
labor union it was procedurally necessary to join as parties those individ-
uals who were alleged to be and were fairly representative of the class 
composed of all union members.3 Only members who participated in, 
authorized, or ratified the union's conduct could be liable. 4 With the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Diluzio v. United Electrical, Radio 
and Machine Workers of America, Local 274, 5 decided during the Survey 
year, this cumbersome procedural requirement will no longer be neces-
sary and labor unions, henceforth, may sue and be sued in their own 
names. 
In Diluzio, the plaintiff sued to recover damages to herself and to her 
automobile which occurred when she drove through the defendants' pick-
et line at her place of employment. 6 She sued the national union, the 
local union and certain individual union members.7 The trial judge granted 
the defendant unions' motion to dismiss on the ground that unions, as 
unincorporated associations, are not subject to suit as separate entities. 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted the plaintiff's petition for direct 
appellate review. 9 
The Court held that labor unions are legal entities for the purposes of 
suing and being sued. lo The Court's departure from the long-standing 
common law rule was based upon its analysis of the changes which have 
taken place with respect to the status of labor unions. I I The Court ob-
§ 4.3. 1 Pickett Y. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 589, 78 N .E. 753, 760 (1906); see Labor 
Relations Comm'n Y. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 374 Mass. 79, 93, 371 N.E.2d 761, 
771 (1977). 
2 Note, Unincorporated Associations, 9 AKRON L. REV. 602, 604 (1976). 
3 Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 
15-16 (1954). 
4 Id. 
s 386 Mass. 314, 435 N .E.2d 1027 (1982). 
6 /d. at 314-15, 435 N.E.2d at 1028. 
7 /d. 
8 /d. at 315, 435 N .E.2d at 1028. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 314, 435 N.E.2d at 1028. 
II /d. at 318, 435 N.E.2d at 1030. 
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served that the circumstances facing labor unions when the common law 
rule was established no longer existed; at common law they were 
"struggling for their existence and for recognition." 12 The Court stated: 
Now "[lI]nions have become ~ndowed with great privileges and respon-
sibilities as representatives of their members. Existence of such privileges 
must be accompanied by a correlative duty not to misuse them to the injury 
of [the public or] individual union members. Immunity for. liability for 
misuse is inconsistent with basic notions of justice." .... "It would be 
unfortunate if an organization with as great power as [a labor Union] has in 
the raising of large funds and in directing the conduct of [its] members in 
carrying on, in a wide territory, industrial controversies and strikes, out of 
which so much unlawful iQjury to private rights is possible, .could assemble 
its assets to be used therein free from liability for injuries by torts committed 
in the course of such strikes." 13 
The Court next addressed the defendants' contention that the Court 
"should await legislative action on this issue. "14 Quoting from Lewis v. 
Lewis,15 the Court rejected the notion of leaving this matter to the va-
garies of the political process, stating: 
•. [I]t is within the power and authority of the court to abrogate [a] judicially 
created rule; and the mere longevity of the rule does not by itself provide 
cause for us to stay our hand if to perpetuate the rule would be to perpetuate 
inequi~y. When the rationales which gave meaning and coherence to a 
judicially created rule are no longer vital, and the rule itself is not consonant 
wjth the needs of contemporary society, a court not only has the authority 
but also has the duty to examine its precedents rather than to apply by rote 
aQ antiquated formula." 16 
The Court thereupon reversed the judgment dismissing the plaintiff's 
complaintY The Court expressly limited its holding "to labor unions 
only, leaving to further development the rules to be applied in cases 
involving other types of unincorporated voluntary associations." 18 
Diluzio is consistent with modern law on the issue. 19 There are only 
three other states which follow the old common law rule. 2@ The practical 
difficulties in conforming with the procedural requirements of the old 
common law rules are obvious. After the Diluzio decision, plaintiffs will 
no longer be discouraged from suing labor unions because of the burdens 
12 ld. 
13 I d. (citations omitted). 
14 ld. at 318-19, 435 N.E.2d at 1030. 
15 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976). 
16 386 Mass. at 318-19, 435 N .E.2d at 1030-31. 
17 ld. at 318-19, 435 N.E.2d at 1031. 
18 /d. at 319 n.6, 435 N.E.2d at 1031 n.6. 
19 See id. at 315 n.2, 435 N .E.2d at 1028 n.2 for a listing of state statutes, court rules, and 
decisions which permit labor unions to sue or to be sued. 
20 See id. at 316 n.3, 435 N.E.2d at 1029 n.3 (The three states are Illinois, Missouri and 
West Virginia). 
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of joining all of its members.21 It is only surprising that this change was 
not forthcoming sooner. 
§ 4.4. State Libel and Tortious Interference with Employment Claims -
Preemption by Federal L~w. Over the years state and federal courts have 
struggled to reconcile federal labor policy with the rights of parties to seek 
redress in state courts for allegedly tortious conduct. During the Survey 
year, the Svpreme Judicial Court addressed this preemption issue in Tosti 
v. Ayik,l a case involving state claims of libel and tortious interference 
with employment. The Tosti Court held that such state court actions are 
not preempted if the plaintiff demonstrates actual malice in accordance 
with the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 2 
The state court action in Tosti arose after the defendants published an 
article in a local union newspaper which stated that the plaintiff was 
performing bargaining unit work contrary to the collective bargaining 
agreement and that he was punching repair tickets without the requisite 
work having been done. 3 Copies of the newspaper were distributed to 
union and management personnel. 4 On the morning following the day 
when the article was distributed, the plaintiff was called to the plant 
manager's office, where the article was mentioned. 5 Two days later the 
plaintiff was fired. 6 The plaintiff then sued alleging that the article libeled 
him and that the defendants had tortiously interfered with his employ-
ment. 7 A jury found for the plaintiff and the defendants appealed. 8 The 
Supreme Judicial Court granted the defendant's request for direct appel-
late review. 9 
The Court began by addressing the issue of preemption of the libel 
claim. The Court properly followed the principles set down by the United 
States Supreme Court in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,lO which estab-
21 One example of how procedural burdens are being lightened is Rule 4(d)(2) of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 735 (1974), which provides for service of 
process upon "an unincorporated association subject to suit withiJ;! the Commonwealth 
under a common name." 
§ 4.4 1 386 Mass. 721, 437 N.E.2d 1062 (1982). 
2 Id. at 723,729, 437'N.E.2d at 1064, 1067 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 279-80 (1964». 
3 Id. at 722, 437 N.E.2d at 1063. 
4Id. 
SId. 
6Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 722-23, 437 N.E.2d at 1063-64. 
9 Id. at 721, 437 N.E.2d at 1062 (reporter's note). 
10 383 U.S. 53 (1966). The statutory definition appears at 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976). 
9
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lished that libel claims arising in the context of a "labor dispute" are not 
governed entirely by state law, since federal law superimposes a malice 
requirement. 11 Turning to the question of whether the article was pub-
lished in the context of a "labor dispute," the Court cited the broad 
statutory definition of that term.12 The Court noted that "[r]arely have 
courts found concerted union activity to fall outside this broad statutory 
definition." 13 The Court determined that the term "should be broadly and 
liberally construed." 14 Under such a construction, the Court readily 
concluded that the article in question was published in the context of a 
labor dispute,15 since the allegedly defamatory statements could not be 
separated from the protected activity concerning the terms and conditions 
of employment. 16 
The Court then examined the manner in which the United States Su-
preme Court has reached an accommodation between federal labor law 
and state libel remedies. The Court noted that whether "partial pre-
emption of state libel remedies" applies "cannot depend on some abstract 
notion of what constitutes a 'labor dispute'; rather, application of [the 
actual malice standard] must turn on whether the defamatory publication 
is made in a context where the policies of the federal labor laws leading to 
protection for freedom of speech are significantly implicated." 17 Because 
Congress wanted to protect the use of "free-wheeling language" in a labor 
dispute context, the Court pointed out, the Supreme Court has required 
that the New York Times actual malice standard be applied in such 
instances. IS The Court rejected the plaintiffs contention that the actual 
malice standard could not be raised for the first time on appeal, observing 
that this involved an issue of subject matter jurisdiction which may be 
raised initially on appeal. 19 The Court stated that, in enacting the federal 
labor laws, Congress" 'deprived the States of the power to act' ... in a 
defamation case arising from a labor dispute absent the correct applica-
tion of the New York Times standard."20 
11 386 Mass. at 723, 437 N .E.2d at 1064. 
12 [d. 
13/d. 
14 /d. (quoting Hasbrouck v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 232, 586 F. 2d 691,694 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 1978)). 
15 /d. at 723-24, 437 N.E.2d at 1064. 
16 /d. at 724, 437 N.E.2d at 1064. The allegedly defamatory statements were those made 
to injure the reputation of the plaintiff. See id. The protected activity was a dispute over 
supervisory personnel doing bargaining unit work. See id. 
17 /d. (citing Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 
418 U.S. 264, 279 (1974)). 
18 /d. at 724-25, 437 N.E.2d at 1065. 
19 /d. at 725, 437 N .E.2d at 1065. 
20 [d. (citing Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 59 (1966)). 
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On the issue of preemption of the tortious interference with employ-
ment claim, the Court concluded that such a claim is not preempted when 
the plaintiff proves that a libel made with actual malice is the basis of such 
interference.21 In the absence of Supreme Court precedent directly ad-
dressing this issue, the Court borrowed the three part test established in 
Linn to support its result. 22 According to the Court this test considered: 
"first, the presence of an overriding State interest; second, whether the 
underlying conduct (the alleged libel) is protected under the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA); and third, the risk that the State cause of 
action would interfere with the effective administration of national labor 
policy. "23 Applying this test, the Court concluded that there is an overrid-
ing State interest in protecting its citizens from tortious conduct, that the 
intentional circulation of defamatory materials is not protected activity, 
and that there is little risk that the interference with the employment cause 
of action, if based on libel made with actual malice, would interfere with 
the effective administration of national labor policy. 24 Judgment was 
reversed and a new trial was ordered for the purpose of applying the 
principles enunciated by the Court to both the libel and the interference 
with employment claims. 25 
The Tosti decision is certainly consistent with the principles set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,26 
Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25,27 and Old Dominion Branch No. 496, 
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin. 28 The resolution of labor law 
preemption issues, however, may be less straightforward in the future. In 
the recent decision of Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor 
Relations Board,29 the United States Supreme Court may have signalled 
the beginning of an erosion of preemption principles as applied to state 
tort claims in the context of labor disputes. The Supreme Court held that 
the National Labor Relations Board may not halt the prosecution of a 
state court lawsuit, regardless of the plaintiff's motive in bringing the suit, 
unless the suit lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law. 30 Under the 
decision, both retaliatory motive and lack of reasonable basis in bringing 
the lawsuit are essential prerequisites to the issuance of a cease-and-desist 
order against a state suit. 31 In the course of its opinion, the Supreme 
21 /d. at 726, 437 N.E.2d at 1065. 
22 Id. at 727, 437 N.E.2d at 1066. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 728-29, 437 N .E.2d at 1066-67. 
25 Id. at 729, 437 N.E.2d at 1067. 
26 383 U.S. 53 (1%6). 
27 430 U.S. 290 (1977). 
28 418 U.S. 264 (1974). 
29 51 U.S.L.W. 4636 (May 31, 1983). 
30 Id. at 4641. 
31 Id. 
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Court enunciated principles that are certain to be relied upon in future 
cases by plaintiffs seeking to expand the availability of state court relief 
for tortious conduct in the context of a labor dispute. 32 Emphasizing the 
importance of access to the courts, the Supreme Court stated: 
We should be sensitive to these First Amendment values in construing the 
NLRA in the present context. As the Board itself has recognized, "going to 
a judicial body for redress of alleged wrongs . . . stands apart from other 
forms of action directed at the alleged wrongdoer. The right of access to a 
court is too important to be called an unfair labor practice solely on the 
ground that what is sought in court is to enjoin employees from exercising a 
protected right." 
Moreover, in recognition of the States' compelling interest in the 
maintenance of domestic peace, the Court has construed the Act as not 
preempting the States from providing a civil remedy for conduct touching 
interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." It has therefore 
repeatedly been held that an employer has the right to seek local judicial 
protection from tortious conduct during a labor dispute. 33 
The tone of the Supreme Court's statements suggests that its emphasis 
is shifting. Prior to this opinion, the sense from reading the Supreme 
Court's opinions in this area was that the principle of preemption was 
paramount and would be permitted to give way only under very limited 
and compelling circumstances. The emphasis of the Supreme Court in Bill 
Johnson's Restaurants, on the other hand, appears to center on the 
importance of protecting rights of parties to seek state court relief for 
tortious conduct. 
Some commentators are certain to emphasize that the quoted language 
should not be read too broadly. They will note that the issue that was 
addressed was the right of access to the courts for redress of allegedly 
tortious conduct and not the principles to be applied. in determining 
whether particular causes of action are preempted. Whatever the interpre-
tation of Bill Johnson's Restaurants, there is certainly more law to be 
made on the issue of preemption of state court claims for tortious conduct 
in the context of a labor dispute. 
§ 4.5. Agency Shop Agreements - Rebate Procedures. As in many states 
which have public employee collective bargaining laws, Massachusetts 
public employers are permitted, pursuant to chapter 150p, section 12 of 
the General Laws, to enter into agency shop agreements with unions 
representing their employees.! Pursuant to such agreements, employees 
32 See id. at 4639. 
33 /d. (citations omitted). 
§ 4.5. 1 G.L. c. 150E, § 12, as amended by Acts of 1977, c. 903, provides in pertinent 
part: 
The commonwealth or any other employer shall require as a condition of employment 
during the life of a collective bargaining agreement so providing, the payment ... of a 
service fee to the employee organization which in accordance with the provisions of 
12
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are required, as a condition of employment, to pay a service fee in an 
amount equal to union dues to unions which represent them in collective 
bargaining. 2 The purposes for which a union can use these service fees, 
however, are not unlimited. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education ,3 
concerning a Michigan law governing agency shop agreements, the 
United States Supreme Court held that while employees may be forced to 
finance collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance ad-
justment expenses, they may not be required to support social, political or 
speech activities of the labor organization. 4 In these latter instances, the 
Court held, the first amendment prohibits unions from requiring any 
employee to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may 
disapprove of as a condition of holding a job as a public school teacher. 5 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed a num-
ber of issues regarding the payment of agency service fees in School 
Committee of Greenfield v. Greenfield Education Association. 6 The case 
this chapter, is duly recognized by the employer or designated by the [Labor Re-
lations] Commission as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit in which such 
employee is employed; provided, however, that such service fee shall not be imposed 
unless the collective bargaining agreement requiring its payment as a condition of 
employment has been formally executed, pursuant to a vote of a majority of all 
employees in such bargaining unit present and voting . . . . The amount of such 
service fee shall be equal to the amount required to become a member and remain a 
member in good standing of the exclusive bargaining agent and its affiliates to or from 
which membership dues or per capita fees are paid or received. No employee 
organization shall receive a service fee as provided herein unless it has established a 
procedure by which any employee so demanding may obtain a rebate of that part of 
said employee's service payment, if any, that represents a pro rata share of expendi-
tures by the organization or its affiliates for: 
(1) contributions to political candidates or political committees formed for a candi-
date or political party; 
(2) publicizing of an organizational preference for a candidate for political office; 
(3) efforts to enact, defeat, repeal or amend legislation unrelated to the wages, 
hours, standards of productivity and performance, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, and the welfare or the working environment of employees represented 
by the exclusive bargaining agent or its affiliates; 
(4) contributions to charitable, religious or ideological [sic] causes not germane to 
its duties as the exclusive bargaining agent; 
(5) benefits which are not germane to the governance or duties as bargaining agent, 
of the exclusive bargaining agent or its affiliates and available only to the members of 
the employee organization. 
It shall be a prohibited labor practice for an employee organization or its affiliates to 
discriminate against an employee on the basis of the employee's membership, non-
membership or agency fee status in the employee organization or its affiliates. 
2 See id. 
3 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
4 [d. at 234-37. 
5 /d. at 235. 
6 385 Mass. 70, 431 N .E.2d 180 (1982). 
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arose when two public school teachers, who were not members of the 
Greenfield Education Association (the" Association "), refUsed to pay the 
service fee required as a condition of employment pursuant to the Associ-
ation's collective bargaining agreement with the Greenfield School Com-
mittee (the "School Committee").7 The Association sought dismissal of 
the teachers whose refusal to pay the fee was based upon their objections 
to the uses to which the fees would be put. 8 The Association agreed to 
drop its demand for termination if the teachers agreed to pay the disputed 
sums into an escrow account pending an evaluation by the·Massachusetts 
Labor Relations Commission (the "Commission") of the allowable 
amount of the fee. 9 The teachers refused and the School Committee voted 
not to dismiss them. lo The Association thereupon sought arbitration, 
pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, of its 
claim that the refusal of the School Committee to dismiss the teachers 
breached the agreement relating to agency service fees. II The instant 
proceeding arose when the School Committee brought an action in 
superior court for a declaratory judgment as to whether it could dismiss 
the teachers without violating their statutory or constitutional rights. 12 
The teachers brought a cross-claim asserting that a rebate procedure 
whereby it would have to pay the Association and then petition for a 
rebate of the fee violated their first amendment rights.13 The superior 
court issued a partial summary judgment for the School t:ommittee and 
denied the Association's motion for summary judgment on the teachers' 
cross-claim. 14 The Supreme Judicial Court granted the Association's mo-
tion for direct appellate review.J5 
The Court first addressed the issue whether these facts presented an 
"actual controversy." 16 The Court answered this question affirmatively, 
noting that the School Committee was caught between the plain terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement and the teachers' statutory and con-
stitutional rights. 17 
The second issue involved whether the trial judge erred in granting a 
7 [d. at 72-73, 431 N .E.2d at 182-83. 
8 [d. at 73, 431 N.E.2d at 183. 
• !d. 
10 Id. 
II Id. 
12 Id. at 73-74, 431 N.E.2d at 183. 
13 Id. at 71, 431 N.E.2d at 183. 
141d. 
15 Id. 
16 l~. at 74, 431 N.E.2d at 183. The School Committee's action was before the superior 
court m part under O.L. c. 231A, § 1 which allows the court to issue a declaratory judgment 
"in any case in which an actual controversy has arisen." !d. 
17 !d. 
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stay of arbitration since section 2 of Chapter 150C expresses a preference 
for arbitration of labor disputes, permitting stays only where there is no 
"agreement to arbitrate" or "the claim sought to be arbitrated does not 
state a controversy covered by the provision for arbitration." 18 The Court 
held that where, as here, the interests of the employees and their bargain-
ing representative are in direct conflict and it is not clear that the employer 
would represent the interests of the employees, a stay of arbitration may 
be granted. 19 
The third question reviewed by the Court involved an issue of primary 
jurisdiction, specifically whether the Association's motion for summary 
judgment on the teachers' cross-claim should have been allowed since the 
issues in litigation were within the special competence of the Commis-
sion.20 The Court concluded that the principle of primary jurisdiction 
"does not apply ... when the issue in controversy turns on questions of 
law which have not been committed to agency discretion. "21 The Court 
concluded that the issues here were legal in nature and were thus not 
committed to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 22 Further, the Court 
found that resolution of the issues would affect many nonparties, "making 
it appropriate for judicial rather than administrative determination. "23 
The issue which received most of the Court's attention involved the 
constitutionality of chapter 150E, section 12.24 The Court noted that all 
parties agreed that the teachers were bound to pay their proportional 
share of the expenses of collective bargaining and grievance adjustment 
and that they could not be forced to contribute to the social, political or 
speech activities of the Association. 25 The issue which remained was 
whether the teachers were required to pay the fee to the Association and 
18 ld. 
19 ld. at 75, 431 N.E.2d at 184. 
20 /d. at 75-76, 431 N.E.2d at 184. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
21 /d. at 76, 431 N.E.2d at 184 (citing Murphy v. Administrator of the Div. of Personnel 
Administration, 377 Mass. 217, 221, 386 N.E.2d 211, 214 (1979». 
22 ld. 
23 ld. The Court noted, however, that the factual issues would remain after the legal 
questions were answered. ld. The Court left the issues to the Labor Relations Commission 
to resolve in the future. [d. at 76, 431 N.E.2d at 184-85. The Commission will determine the 
amount an employee organization and its affiliates can lawfully assess as an agency service 
fee, in light of this decision. ld. at 76, 431 N.E.2d at 185. 
24 ld. at 77-86, N.E.2d at 185-90. Before reaching the constitutional issue, the Court 
briefly disposed of a contention by the teachers and the School Committee that the discharge 
of tenured teachers is prohibited without good cause pursuant to O.L. c. 71, § 42 and that 
dismissal for failure to pay an agency service fee is not good cause.ld. at 77, 431 N .E.2d at 
185. The Court found it unnecessary to reach this issue because no decision to discharge the 
teachers had been made. /d. 
251d. at 78, 431 N.E.2d at 185. 
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then exhaust the Association's rebate procedures before challenging the 
amount of the fee before another tribunal. 26 
The Court rejected the Association's contention that the teachers were 
required to submit to the Association's rebate procedures as their primary 
remedy, concluding that such a requirement would render the statute 
constitutionally suspect on first amendment grounds. 27 The Court noted 
that section 12 does not clearly require the use of union rebate proce-
dures, which must exist in some form under the statute, to the exclusion 
of all other remedies or require that unions be given use of the agency fees 
in the interim. 28 The Court followed Ball v. Detroit,29 holding that "the 
statutory right of the organization to the permissible amount [of the 
service fee] is outweighed by the potential that impermissible amounts 
will be used, even temporarily, in violation of the dissenting teachers' First 
Amendment rights." 30 
The Court also refused to permit the Association to receive the entire 
fee pending proof of legitimacy, since this would not only deprive the 
teachers of the opportunity to engage in expressive activities themselves 
with those funds, but would also force them to at least temporarily 
subsidize the objectionable activities of the Association. 31 The Court 
remarked that dissenting employees may constitutionally be required to 
pay the disputed fee into a neutral escrow account pending adjudication of 
the permissible fee by the Commission.32 
Finally, the Court concluded that when a fee is challenged by an 
employee before the Commission, the burden of justifying the fee rests 
with the union. 33 The Court counselled, however, that the Commission 
should give prompt attention to such complaints in order to accommodate 
the competing interests involved, noting that protecting rights of dissent-
ing employees is "not a justification for allowing an association to be 
'crippled by non-access to that portion of the fee which will be used for 
collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjust-
ment.' "34 
26 ld. 
27 ld. at 79, 431 N .E.2d at 186. 
28 ld. at 81, 431 N.E.2d at 187. A rebate procedure allows the union to collect the service 
fee for improper as well as proper uses, a percentage being returned t~ the employee at the 
end of the year based on the amount improperly used. See id. at 78 n.4, 431 N .E.2d at 186 
n.4. 
29 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978). 
30 385 Mass. at 83, 431 N.E.2d at 188. 
31 ld. at 83-84, 431 N.E.2d at 189. 
32 ld. at 84-85, 431 N .E.2d at 189. 
33 ld. at 85, 431 N.E.2d at 189. 
34 ld. at 85, 431 N.E.2d at 189-90 (citing White Cloud Educ. Ass'n v. White Cloud Bd. of 
Educ., 101 Mich. App. 309, 319, 300 N.W.2d 556, 563 (1980). 
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In December of 1982, the Labor Relations Commission promulgated 
regulations for dealing with complaints challenging agency service fees. 35 
These regulations include a requirement that the complaining party pay 
into a neutral escrow account a sum equal to the agency service fee. 36 The 
new regulations also specify various allowable and non-allowable collec-
tive bargaining representation expenses,37 
3S 341 Mass. Admin. Reg. 47-55 (December 9, 1982) (codified in MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
402, § 17.00). 
36 341 Mass. Admin. Reg. 51-52 (codified in MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 402, § 17.07). 
37 In pertinent part, the new regulations provide: 
17.04: Impermissible and Permissible Costs 
(I) Costs attributable to the following shall be deemed impermissible in computing 
a service fee: 
(a) Expenditures for political candidates or political committees formed for a 
candidate or political party; 
(b) Establishing and publicizing of an organizational preference for a candi-
date for political office; 
(c) Lobbying or efforts to enact, defeat, repeal or amend legislation or 
regulations unrelated to wages, hours, standards of productivity and perfor-
mance, and other terms and conditions of employment of employees rep-
resented by the bargaining agent or its affiliates; 
(d) Expenditures for charitable, religious or ideological causes not germane 
to a bargaining agent's duties as the exclusive representative; 
(e) Benefits and activities which are: 
1. not germane to the governance or duties of the bargaining agent, 
and 
2. available only to the members of the employee organization which 
is the exclusive bargaining agent; 
(f) Fines, penalties or damages arising from the unlawful activities of a 
bargaining agent or a bargaining agent's officers, agents or members; 
(g) Overhead and administrative costs allocable to any activity listed in 
sections (a) through (f) above. 
(2) Costs attributable to the following shall be deemed permissible to the extent that 
they are not deemed impermissible under 402 CMR 17.04(1) above. 
(a) Preparation, negotiation, and ratification of collective bargaining agree-
ments; 
(b) Adjusting employee grievances and complaints; 
(c) The public advertising of positions on the negotiating of, or provisions in, 
collective bargaining agreements, as well as on matters relating to the collec-
tive bargaining process and contract administration; 
(d) Purchasing of materials and supplies used in matters relating to the 
collective bargaining process and contract administration; 
(e) Paying specialists in labor law, negotiations, economics and other sub-
jects for services used in matters relating to working conditions and to the 
collective bargaining process and contract administration; 
(f) Organizing within the charging party's bargaining unit; 
(g) Organizing bargaining units in which charging parties are not employed, 
including units where there is an existing exclusive bargaining agent; 
(h) Defending the employee organization seeking a service fee against ef-
forts by other unions or organizing committees to gain representation rights in 
17
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In Greenfield School Committee, the Court correctly recognized that if 
the teachers had been required to pursue the portion of their agency 
service fees allegedly collected for improper purposes only through the 
complex rebate procedures of the various teacher associations which 
received a share of the fee,38 then the restrictions on agency service fees 
under chapter 150E, section 1239 would be meaningless. Accordingly, the 
Court held that the teachers had the option of bringing their rebate claims 
before the Labor Relations Commission. 
§ 4.6. Approval of Multi-year Contractual Commitments - Nondelegable 
Duty Doctrine - Notice and Hearing. Perhaps the most significant deci-
sion of the Supreme Judicial Court in the public sector labor and employ-
ment law field during the Survey year was Boston Teachers Union, Local 
66 v. School Committee of Boston. l This decision involved three cases 
which had been consolidated for determination of the rights and obliga-
tions of various parties in the second year of a collective bargaining 
agreement between the Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 (the "BTU") 
and the School Committee of the City of Boston (the "School Commit-
tee").2 Boston Teachers Union establishes significant precedent in sev-
units represented by the employee organization seeking an agency fee or by its 
affiliates; 
(i) Proceedings involving jurisdictional controversies under the AFL-CIO 
constitution or analogous provisions governing bargaining agents that are not 
affiliated with the AFL-CIO; 
(j) Lobbying or efforts to enact, defeat, repeal, or amend legislation or 
regulations relating to wages, hours, standards of productivity and perfor-
mance, and other terms and conditions of employment of employees rep-
resented by the bargaining agent or its affiliates; 
(k) Paying costs and fees to labor organizations affiliated with the bargaining 
agent seeking an agency fee; 
(I) Meetings and conventions; 
(m) Publications of the bargaining agent seeking a service fee; 
(n) Lawful impasse procedures to resolve disputes arising in connection 
with negotiating and enforcing collective bargaining agreements I 
(0) Professional services rendered to the exclusive bargaining flgent and its 
affiliates; 
(p) Wages and benefits for persons employed by the bargainipg agent; 
(q) All other activities not listed in 402 CMR 17.04(1); 
(r) Overhead and administrative costs allocable to any item in 402 CMR 
17.04(2)(a) through (q) above. 
341 Mass. Admin. Reg. 49-50. 
38 The rebate procedures of the various associations are discussed by the Court. 385 
Mass. at 78 n.4, 431 N.E.2d at 186 n.4. 
39 See supra note l. 
§ 4.6. I 386 Mass. 197,434 N.E.2d 1258 (1982). 
2 ld. at 198, 434 N .E.2d at 1260. In the first case, the BTU sought declaratory and 
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eral important areas of public sector labor law. 
On August 29, 1980, the School Committee concluded the negotiation 
of a three-year agreement with the BTU, subject to appropriation of funds 
by the city council and the mayor. 3 The agreement contained a job 
security clause which for the first two years of the agreement protected 
the jobs of teachers and nurses who had tenure or a permanent appoint-
ment. 4 The required funds were appropriated to implement the first year 
of the agreement. On March 12, 1981, however, the mayor notified the 
School Committee that he would not provide any funds for fiscal year 
1981-82 beyond those which the School Committee could appropriate in 
its own right pursuant to law. 5 No action was taken on a formal request 
that the mayor and city council appropriate the additional funds necessary 
to implement the secopd year salary increases. 6 
As a result of the inability to obtain funding from the mayor and the city 
council, the School Committee notified 2,261 tenured teachers and per-
manently appointed nurses that the School Committee would vote on 
their layoff or dismissal. 7 The parties agreed that such a layoff or dismiss-
al would violate the job security clause of the agreement between the 
School Committee and the BTU.s Injunctive relief was sought in the 
superior court by the BTU to enforce the job security provision and to 
prevent the layoffs and dismissals. 9 The School Committee sought a 
declaration of the obligations of the city council, the mayor and the 
School Committee with respect to the funding and implementation of the 
injunctive relief to prevent the lay-off of over two thousand tenured teachers and perma-
nently employed school nurses. In the second case, the School Committee sought a declara-
tion of the duties of the city council, the mayor and the School Committee with regard to the 
funding and implementation of the collective bargaining agreement. In the third case, the 
BTU sought declaratory and injunctive relief to force the mayor to submit to the city council 
the School Committee's request for an appropriation of $8.2 million to fund the salary 
increases in the second year of the collective bargaining agreement. Jd. at 198-99, 434 
N.E.2d at 1260. 
3 Jd. at 200, 434 N .E.2d at 1261. 
4 Jd. at 200-01, 434 N .E.2d at 1261. 
5 Id. at 201, 434 N .E.2d at 1261. Chapter 224 of the Acts of 1936 prescribes the method for 
financing the Boston Public Schools. This method authorizes the School Committee itself to 
appropriate funds for general school purposes up to a limit calculated by a statutory formula. 
Id. at 197, 200, 434 N.E.2d 1258, 1261. If additional funds are necessary, the School 
Committee must seek monies through the usual municipal finance channels, and request, 
through the mayor, a supplemental appropriation by the city council. Id. The mayor may 
decline to submit the request, however, provided such action is not repugnant to chapter 
150E. Jd. 
6 ld. at 201, 434 N.E.2d at 1261. 
7 Jd. at 202, 434 N.E.2d at 1262. 
• Jd. 
9 Id. at 198, 434 N .E.2d at 1260. 
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agreement. IO The Supreme Judicial Court ordered direct review of the 
claims on its own initiative. I I 
The Court held that the mayor and the city council are required to 
appropriate the funds necessary to implement the second year economic 
provisions, rejecting the argument that the enforceability of those eco-
nomic provisions is subject to the annual appropriation process. 12 The 
Court stated: 
We think that the requirement in [section] 7(b) [of chapter 150E], that the 
employer submit a request to the appropriate legislative body for an appro-
priation sufficient to fund the cost items for the agreement, applies only to 
funds needed in the first year of the agreement, and that an appropriation 
funding the first year of the contract constitutes an approval by the legisla-
tive body of the entire agreementY 
This interpretation, according to the Court, was the only way section 7(b), 
which provides for the submission of a request for appropriation "within 
thirty days after the date on which the agreement is executed by the 
parties" and for the return of cost items for further bargaining if the 
legislative body rejects the request, could be construed consistently with 
section 7(a), which authorizes contracts of up to three years' durationY 
The Court found several sources of support for its holding. The Court 
noted that its holding was consistent with Mendes v. Taunton, 15 in which 
it held that salary increases for city workers provided for in the second 
year of collective bargaining agreements are effective despite the provi-
10 ld. at 198-99,434 N.E.2d at 1260. In a third claim, the BTU sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief to compel the mayor to submit to the city council the school committee's 
request for funds to implement the second year salary increases under the agreement. ld. at 
199,434 N.E.2d at 1260. See supra note 2. 
11 ld. at 198,434 N.E.2d at 1260. 
12 ld. at 203, 434 N.E.2d at 1262. 
13 /d. at 204, 434 N.E.2d at 1263. 
14 /d. The pertinent provisions of O.L. c. 150E, § 7 state: 
(a) Any collective bargaining agreement reached between the employer and the 
exclusive representative shall not exceed a term of three years. The agreement shall 
be reduced to writing, executed by the parties, and a copy of such agreement shall be 
filed with the Commission and with the house and senate committees on ways and 
means forthwith by the employer. 
(b) The employer, other than the board of regents of higher education, the chief 
administrative justice of the trial court or the state lottery CommisSion, shall submit 
to the appropriate legislative body within thirty days after the date on which the 
agreement is executed by the parties, a request for an appropriation necessary to fund 
the cost items contained therein; provided, that if the general court is not in session at 
that time, such request shall be submitted at the next session thereof. If the appropri-
ate legislative body duly rejects the request for an appropriation necessary to fund the 
cost items, such cost items shall be returned to the parties for further bargaining. The 
provisions of the preceding two sentences shall not apply to agreements reached by 
School Committees in cities and towns in which the provisions of section thirty-four 
of chapter seventy-one are operative. 
15 366 Mass. 109, 315 N.E.2d 865 (1974). 
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sions of chapter 44, section 33A of the General Laws,16 and noted that a 
contrary conclusion "would render virtually ineffective the important 
provision in [the predecessor of chapter 150E, section 7(a)] which permits 
three-year collective bargaining contracts for municipal employees." 17 As 
additional support for its holding, the Court relied upon the legislative 
history of chapter 150E, section 7(d)(f), which provides that, if there is a 
conflict between the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and chap-
ter 44, section 33A, the terms ofthe agreement prevail. 18 The Court found 
the legislative history demonstrated the Legislature's intent "to remove 
any obstacle to the enforceability of clauses in collective bargaining 
agreements that provide for future salary increases. " 19 The Court further 
noted that the Legislature has authorized other types of multi-year munic-
ipal agreements. 20 Since it would be absurd to suggest that the enforce-
ability of such contracts is conditional upon an annual appropriation, the 
Court found that it would also be anomalous for economic improvements 
to be subject to annual appropriations. 21 In sum, the Court determined 
that approval ofthe first year economic items constitutes a commitment to 
fund incremental cost items in subsequent contract years.22 According to 
the Court, employees who failed to receive their salary increases pursuant 
to the contract had a remedy of either suing the city for breach of contract 
or filing a grievance under section 8 of chapter 150E.23 
The Court next turned to the issue whether the job secunty clause in the 
contract was enforceable. 24 The Court found that it is now well-
established that there are certain prerogatives exercised by public em-
ployers which cannot be limited by a collective bargaining agreement. 25 
The Court observed that this principle had been employed to invalidate 
certain contractual commitments entered into by school committees "in 
order that collective actions not distort the normal political process for 
controlling public policy. "26 In the course of establishing this non-
16 In pertinent part, G.L. c. 44, § 33A states: 
"No new [municipal) position shall be created or increase in rate made by ordinance, vote or 
appointment during the financial year subsequent to the submission of the annual budget 
unless provision therefore has been made by means of a supplemental appropriation .... " 
17 386 Mass. at 204, 434 N .E.2d at 1263 (quoting Mendes v. Taunton, 366 Mass. 109, 113, 
315 N .E.2d 865, 869 (1974». G.L. c. 149, § 1781 was the predecessor ofG.L. c. 150E, § 7(a). 
18 386 Mass. at 205, 434 N .E.2d at 1263. 
19 Jd. 
20 Jd. at 208-09, 434 N.E.2d at 1265. 
21 Jd. at 209, 434 N .E.2d at 1265. 
22 Jd. at 210, 434 N.E.2d at 1265-66. 
23 Jd. at 210-11, 434 N.E.2d at 1266. 
24 Jd. at 211, 434 N.E.2d at 1266. 
25 Jd. (citing School Committee of Braintree v. Raymond, 369 Mass. 686, 343 N .E.2d 145 
(1976) and Chief of Police of Dracut v. Dracut, 357 Mass. 492, 258 N.E.2d 531 (1970». 
26 Jd. 
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delegable managerial prerogative precept, the Court noted, certain com-
mitments relating to matters such as class size and teaching load had been 
distinguished and sustained "where there [was] no change in educational 
policy and funds [were] available to implement the terms of the agree-
ment."27 
Against this background, the Court concluded that a contractual restric-
tion on "the ability of a school committee to determine on an annual basis 
the size of its teaching staff intrudes into an area of exclusive managerial_ 
prerogative. "28 Noting that the General Laws accord school committees 
"general charge of all the public schools," the Court concluded: 
Essential to the management of the public schools is the ability to determine 
the appropriate size of the teaching staff in light of available funds. We do 
not believe that the Legislature, in chapter 150E, meant to permit school 
committees to bargain away their managerial powers in this area. 29 
The Court read into chapter 71, section 42 of the General Laws, the 
teacher tenure statute, a legislative intent that the authority in question 
remain beyond the reach of collective bargaining. 30 The Court observed 
that section 42, in discussing dismissals of tenured teachers, provides that 
"[n]either this nor the preceding section shall affect the right of a commit-
tee to dismiss a teacher whenever an actual decrease in the number of 
pupils in the schools of the town renders such action advisable."3! This 
provision, the Court noted, demonstrated an intent that "general econ-
omy and efficient use of scarce funds [be considered] analogous consid-
erations in the decision to reduce staff size. "32 The Court concluded that 
section 42 "can therefore be said to illustrate a policy ofleaving the entire 
area of decision-making to the managerial discretion of the school com-
mittee. "33 Nevertheless, the Court held that a job security clause "is 
enforceable for periods not spanning more than one fiscal year," recogniz-
ing that "the interest in protecting the managerial prerogative of the 
school committee ... diminishes once the year's budget has been estab-
lished" and that the impact of a mid-year layoff on a teacher would likely 
be acute. 34 
27 ld. at 211-12, 434 N.E.2d at 1267. (citing Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School 
Committee of Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 464, 350 N.E.2d 707, 714 (1976). 
28 ld. at 212, 434 N.E.2d at 1267 (emphasis added). 
29 ld. (footnote omitted). 
30 ld. at 212-13, 434 N.E.2d at 1267. 
31 ld. at 212, 434 N.E.2d at 1267. 
32 ld. at 212-13, 434 N.E.2d at 1267. 
33 ld. at 213, 434 N.E.2d at 1267. 
34 ld. at 213, 434 N.E.2d at 1267-68. The Court then specified numerous related matters 
which are within the legitimate scope of collective bargaining.ld. at 213, 434 N .E.2d at 1268. 
Among these were matters relating to the timing of lay-offs and the number and identity of 
the employees affected. ld. 
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Before leaving this issue, the Court addressed the subsidiary question 
of whether the mayor and the city council had standing to challenge the 
validity of the job security clause.3s The Court found they did have 
standing, stating that the basis for this finding was the unique method of 
financing the Boston public schools. 36 The Court indicated that, ordi-
narily, "ajob security clause should be enforceable against the legislative 
body of a municipality if the school committee decides as a matter of 
educational policy that the clause ought to be enforced and requests an 
appropriation of the necessary funds."37 The Court concluded, however, 
that in the case of Boston, the School Committee could not force the 
mayor and city council to appropriate funds for the maintenance of the job 
security clause, since under its system of financing the schools the pri-
mary funding responsibility was the School Committee's.3s 
The final issue addressed by the Court was whether the tenured teach-
ers who were to be laid off were entitled to individual hearings pursuant to 
chapter 71, section 42.39 The court referred to Milne v. School Comm. of 
35 ld. at 214, 434 N.E.2d at 1268. 
36 ld. See supra note 5. 
37 386 Mass. at 214, 434 N.E.2d at 1268. 
38 ld. 
39 ld. at 214-15, 434 N.E.2d at 1268. G.L. c. 71, § 42 provides in pertinent part: 
The School Committee may dismiss any teacher, but no teacher and no superinten-
dent, other than a union superintendent and the superintendent of schools in the city 
of Boston, shall be dismissed unless by a two thirds vote of the whole committee .... 
In every such town a teacher or superintendent employed at discretion under section 
forty-one or a superintendent employed under a contract, for the duration of his 
contract, shall not be dismissed, except for inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbe-
coming a teacher or superintendent, insubordination or other good cause, nor unless 
at least thirty days, exclusive of customary vacation periods, prior to the meeting at 
which the vote is to be taken, he shall have been notified of such intended vote; nor 
unless, if he so requests, he shall have been furnished by the committee with a written 
charge or charges of the cause or causes for which his dismissal is proposed; nor 
unless, if he so requests, he has been given a hearing before the School Committee 
which may be either public or private at the discretion of the School Committee and at 
which he may be represented by counsel, present evidence and call witnesses to 
testify in his behalf and examine them; nor unless the charge or charges shall have 
been substantiated; nor unless, in the case ofa teacher, the superintendent shall have 
given the committee his recommendations thereon .... Neither this nor the preceding 
section shall affect the right of a committee to dismiss a teacher whenever an actual 
decrease in the number of pupils in the schools of the town renders such action 
advisable. In case a decrease in the number of pupils in the schools of a town renders 
advisable the dismissal of one or more teachers, a teacher who is serving at the 
discretion of a School Committee under section forty-one shall not be dismissed if 
there is a teacher not serving at discretion whose position the teacher serving at 
discretion is qualified to fill. No teacher or superintendent who has been lawfully 
dismissed shall receive compensation for services rendered thereafter. 
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Manchester ,40 where it had determined that the notice and hearing re-
quirements of section 42 did not apply to dismissals based solely on an 
actual decrease in student enrollments. Building on Milne, the Court held 
that section 42 does not require notice and a hearing when a tenured 
teacher is dismissed solely because of budgetary considerations.41 The 
Court concluded: "Logic dictates that dismissals based solely on budget-
ing considerations be treated no differently than dismissals made because 
of declining enrollments. "42 The Court then found that, given its con-
struction of section 42, the protection from dismissal because of a de-
crease in student enrollment enjoyed by a tenured teacher when there is a 
nontenured teacher in a position which the tenured teacher is qualified to 
fill applies equally to a tenured teacher dismissed solely for budgetary 
reasons.43 Although this protection exists, the Court held, the hearing 
requirements still do not apply. 44 In a footnote, the Court suggested that 
the inapplicability of the notice and hearing requirements to situations in 
which the tenured teacher can demonstrate that there is a nontenured 
teacher in a position which the tenured teacher is qualified to fill is a defect 
in section 42.45 The Court remanded the cases to the Superior Court for 
proceedings consistent with its opinion.46 
It will be interesting to observe whether the Court's holding that the 
appropriation of funds to implement first year economic improvements is 
tantamount to a multi-year economic commitment will have any practical 
effect upon collective bargaining in the public sector. Traditionally, town 
meetings are presented with budgets which seek approval of the coming 
year's economic costs. In light of the implications of this case, it would 
appear prudent for a public employer, which has negotiated a multi-year 
collective bargaining agreement, to explain to the relevant legislative 
body the economic costs in all years of the agreement and make it clear 
that its approval of the first year costs will constitute approval of costs 
associated with subsequent contract years. The questions whether there 
will be fewer multi-year contracts because legislative bodies will no longer 
have "a string" on costs for improvements in mture. contract years, 
whether this case will lead public employers to seek pI1ovisions in con-
tracts making enforceability of second and third year edonomic changes 
conditional upon further appropriations, and whether the legislative body 
may expressly negate the presumption that its first year appropriation is 
40 381 Mass. 581, 410 N.E.2d 1216 (1980). 
41 386 Mass. 197, 216, 434 N.E.2d 1258, 1269. 
42 /d. at 215, 434 N.E.2d at 1269. 
43 /d. at 216, 434 N.E.2d at 1269. 
44 Jd. 
4S /d. at 216 n.22, 434 N .E.2d at 1269 n.22. 
46 /d. at 217, 434 N.E.2d at 1270. 
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an approval of the second and third year cost items, await future resolu-
tion. 
A provision such as the no-layoff guarantee which was present in 
Boston Teachers Union is of central importance to a contract settlement. 
After Boston Teachers Union, unions may reconsider the desirability of 
separability clauses which preserve the integrity of the remainder of the 
contract when a particular provision is invalidated. At the very least, it is 
likely that they will wish to preserve their right to negotiate a substitute 
provision. The decision also poses the question whether, absent a separa-
bility clause, a union may obtain an order invalidating the agreement on 
the ground that, by reneging on a commitment, particularly one of major 
significance, the employer has denied the union the benefits of its bargain. 
The Court's conclusion that the chapter 71, section 42 notice and 
hearing requirements do not apply to layoffs and dismissals based exclu-
sively on budgetary considerations would appear to involve a degree of 
judicial legislating. Rationally, the Legislature should have so provided, 
but it did not. When the Court noted that its construction of section 42, 
here and in Milne, may have detected a flaw in that section, it was 
identifying the basis for the conclusion that the Legislature did not con-
template the result reached here by the Court. It remains to be seen 
whether the Legislature will act on the Court's suggestion that the law be 
amended to accord some remedy to a tenured teacher facing lay-off who 
wishes to demonstrate that he or she is qualified to fill a position presently 
occupied by a nontenured teacher. 
§ 4.7. Open Meeting Law - Litigation Strategy and Disciplinary Action 
Exemptions. Litigation between the City of Boston and its teachers during 
the Survey year was not limited to the Boston Teachers Union decision. I 
The fiscal strife in the Boston Public Schools during 1982 produced a 
second Supreme Judicial Court opinion, Doherty v. School Committee of 
Boston. 2 The issues in Doherty involved the application of chapter 39, 
section 23B of the General Laws, the Massachusetts open meeting law. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has stated that the open meeting law was 
"designed to eliminate much of the secrecy surrounding the deliberations 
and decisions on which public policy is based."3 The statute sets forth the 
general proposition that "all meetings of a governmental body be open to 
the public. "4 The Supreme Judicial Court has recognized, however, that 
§ 4.7. I The Boston Teachers Union decision is discussed in section 6 of this chapter. 
2 386 Mass. 643, 436 N .E.2d 1223 (1982). 
3 Ghighione v. School Committee of Southbridge, 376 Mass. 70, 72, 378 N .E.2d 984, 987 
(1978). 
4 G. L. c. 39, § 23 B states in pertinent part: .. All meetings of a governmental body shall be 
open to the public and any person shall be permitted to attend any meeting except as 
otherwise provided by this section." 
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the statute also contemplates that there will be instances when "[p Jublic 
officials ... might be unduly hampered in the performance of their duties 
if all gatherings of members of included governmental bodies must be 
open to the public."5 The statute enumerates specific exemptions from 
the general proposition that meetings must be open.6 Among meetings 
which are exempt are: (1) those for the purpose of taking disciplinary 
action against a public employee;7 and (2) those discussing strategy with 
respect to litigation' 'if any open meetings would have a detrimental effect 
on the ... litigating position of a governmental body."8 
In Doherty, the Court determined that the exemption involving disci-
plinary action does not permit a meeting to consider layoffs of teachers for 
budgetary reasons to be held in executive session. 9 The Court held, 
however, that the litigation strategy exemption does allow such layoffs to 
be considered without an open meeting. tO Moreover, the Court con-
cluded, when a governmental body is entitled to meet in executive session 
under an exemption, there is no requirement that it reconvene in open 
session to ratify the actions taken in executive session. ll 
Doherty arose in connection with efforts to invalidate the decision of 
the School Committee of the City of Boston (the "School Committee") to 
lay off teachers and nurses, which was made in executive session and not 
ratified in open sessionY The trial court judge ruled that the School 
Committee did not violate the open meeting law by conducting its deliber-
ations in executive session, but that the School Committee was obliged to 
reconvene in open session to ratify its action because there was no 
showing that an open meeting would have had a detrimental effect on the 
litigation position of the School Committee. 13 The Supreme Judicial Court 
ordered direct appellate review on its own initiative of the resultant cross 
appeals. t4 
The plaintiffs' appeal contended that the School Committee's action 
should be invalidated because the affected teachers were entitled to notice 
and an opportunity to be heard pursuant to Chapter 39, section 23B, when 
5 Ohiglione v. School Committee of Southbridge, 376 Mass. 70, 72-73, 378 N.E.2d 984, 
987 (1978). 
6 O.L. c. 39, § 23B(1)-(7) . 
• 7 O.L. c. 39, § 23B(2). 
8 O.L. c. 39, § 23B(3). 
9 386 Mass. at 646-47, 436 N .E.2d at 1226 (1982). 
10 /d. at 647-48, 436 N.E.2d at 1226-27. 
11Id. 
12 /d. at 644-45, 436 N.E.2d at 1225. For some background on the layoff controversy, see 
section 6 of this chapter. 
13 Id. at 645-46, 436 N.E.2d at 1225. 
14 See id. at 643, 436 N.E.2d at 1224 (reporter's note). 
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disciplinary actions are considered in executive session. IS The Court 
found this argument inapplicable since the layoffs were not disciplinary 
dismissals, but, rather, were based solely on budgetary considerations. 16 
The Court explained that policy considerations favoring the exemption of 
disciplinary action from the open meeting law were not present when the 
School Committee considered neither the dismissal nor the misconduct of 
any particular individual,17 
In its appeal the School Committee argued that it was authorized to 
meet in executive session to discuss litigation strategy and, further, that 
the judge had erred when he declared that the School Committee had to 
reconvene in open session. IS The Court sustained the School Commit-
tee's appeal, ruling that the School Committee was authorized to meet 
in executive session and was not obligated to reconvene in open session to 
ratify action taken in executive session. 19 The Court first noted that 
nothing in the litigation strategy exemption, chapter 39, section 23B(3), 
expressly required the School Committee to reconvene in executive ses-
sion if, at the time the executive session was held, litigation was being 
threatened and discussion in an open meeting "might have an adverse 
impact on the committee's litigation position. "20 Turning to the question 
whether the litigation strategy exemption did, in fact, apply to the instant 
case, the Court held that it did even though no litigation was actually 
pending on this issue because other factually related cases were being 
litigated. 21 
This is a reasonable and welcome application of the litigation strategy 
exemption. A public employer which faces a likely judicial challenge to its 
contemplated actions could be severely compromised by having to con-
duct its deliberations in public. The Court recognized that, despite the 
strong public policy considerations favoring open meetings of governmen-
tal bodies, the public interest would be ill-served if deliberations of the 
type illustrated in Doherty, which are likely to lead to litigation, are open 
to the public. 
During the 1981 Survey year, these commentators observed that the 
Court appeared to construe the open meeting statute very strictly, even 
when public policy favored a less rigid interpretation in certain in-
stances. 22 The Court then seemed to be saying that it would not imply 
limitations on the general obligation that meetings must be conducted in 
15 Jd. at 646, 436 N .E.2d at 1225-26. 
16 Id. at 646-47, 436 N.E.2d at 1226. 
17 Jd. at 646, 436 N.E.2d at 1226. 
18 Jd. at 647, 436 N.E.2d at 1226. 
19Id. at 647-48, 436 N.E.2d at 1226-27. 
20 Id. at 647, 436 N .E.2d at 1226. 
21 Jd. at 648, 436 N.E.2d at 1226-27. 
22 See Ross, Labor and Employment Law, 1981 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW. § 7.9, at 192-%. 
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open session, and that any such limitations would have to be promulgated 
by the Legislature. In Doherty, however, reason and logic prevailed. The 
question remains whether the Court will view Doherty as a case of limited 
application because of the particularly severe fiscal circumstances present 
there and the certain litigation which was likely to ensue from the School 
Committee's decision, or whether the litigation strategy exemption will be 
applicable whenever a public body reasonably believes that litigation may 
result from its actions. The answer to this question awaits further court 
decision. Given the past hesitancy of Massachusetts courts to broadly 
construe the exemptions from the open meeting law, 23 these commen-
tators suggest that future application of the litigation strategy exemption 
may not be as broad as Doherty suggests. It is certain, however, that, until 
it is judicially curtailed, public bodies will use the litigation strategy 
exemption to a greater degree than in the past. 
23 See District Attorney for Northwestern District v. Board of Selectmen of Sunderland, 
1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 740,418 N.E.2d 642. 
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